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The 2014 Oil Price Collapse and the Diverse Tales of 
Three Oil Exporters 
1
Samya Beidas-Ström and Marco Lorusso
ICD Seminar 
13th March 2018
Central questions
• What has been the impact of the 2014 oil price collapse on oil exporters’ key macro 
variables? 
• Are oil exporters’ economic structures and policy instruments/toolkits similar? If not, 
how different are they, and why is this distinction important? 
• Given these differences, what is the best approach to fiscal consolidation in oil exporting 
economies?
• Does the global shift away from fossil fuels bode ill for oil exporters? Or can they support 
growth in their economies while oil is cheap? If they do, are their side effects? 
• How can policy makers in these oil exporting economies better calibrate or target fiscal 
and other reforms to support medium-term output growth, without building up 
vulnerabilities? 
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Outline of Presentation
• Stylized facts from three oil exports: Russia, Saudi Arabia and the U.K.
• Modelling these oil exporter
• Estimation of our models—different underlying structures and rich policies
• Responses from fiscal and oil intensity shocks
• Drivers of output volatility in 2014
• Scenarios for better outcomes
• Conclusions and policy implications
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DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS
4
Oil prices and TOT co-move reflecting 
exchange rate regime and extent of diversification
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UK Saudi Russia
Output, public debt and oil prices
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UK Saudi Russia
Public spending and oil prices
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Saudi Russia
MODEL OVERVIEW
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Households’ maximization problem
Max utility
s.t. budget constraint
UK Saudi Russia
and private capital accumulation 
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Firms’ minimization problem
Produce three types of goods, two of which use oil: 
(i) Demand side: Final private consumption goods sold to hhs, produced competitively: 
After combining domestic consumption goods with imported foreign goods:
(ii) Private investment goods, produced competitively, with imported foreign goods:
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Firms  (concluded) and Output
Produce three types of goods, two of which use oil: 
(iii) Supply side: Intermediate domestic goods produced monopolistically: 
With public capital playing a key role in recent years (unlike UK)
Being s.t. time-to-build delays
And thus total output production 
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UK
Russia & Saudi Arabia
Fiscal and monetary sectors
Different fiscal regimes as manifest in these budget constraints:
UK Saudi Russia
where tax elasticities are estimated
Different monetary regimes as manifest in these Taylor rules:
UK Saudi & Russia
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Full set of fiscal tax rules
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ESTIMATION—DEEP PARAMETERS
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Not all oil exporters are alike structurally
Underlying structural features of oil 
economies—not all are alike:
• Although Russia and Saudi Arabia have big public 
spending ratios similar to UK, due to big role of 
the state in economy and welfare state, 
investment spending is smaller and:
• Saudi Arabian HHs prefer to supply less labor
• Both HHs face higher borrowing costs
• Both are more capital intensive:
– Capital especially large in goods 
production
– And in imported capital Saudi goods 
production
• Both more oil intense in consumption and 
production, with latter particularly large—both 
open up room for more adequate taxation
• Russia’s consumption is less heavily weighted in 
imports—unlike the UK and Saudi
• Public capital in both faces time-to-build delays 
and depreciates less than private capital  
• Wages and prices are more rigid or indexed in 
Russia and Saudi than in the UK, holding back 
potential output 15
Estimated structural parameters
𝜹𝜹𝟏𝟏
𝒈𝒈
𝜱𝜱𝟏𝟏
𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈 𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏
𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝝓𝝓𝟏𝟏
𝒃𝒃 𝝓𝝓𝟏𝟏
𝒌𝒌 𝝓𝝓𝟏𝟏
𝒌𝒌𝒈𝒈 𝝎𝝎𝟏𝟏
𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝝎𝝎𝟏𝟏
𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝝎𝝎𝟏𝟏
𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒐 𝝎𝝎𝟏𝟏
𝒎𝒎𝒈𝒈 𝑮𝑮𝟏𝟏
𝒅𝒅 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺
𝒀𝒀𝟏𝟏
𝒅𝒅 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺
𝑰𝑰𝟏𝟏
𝒅𝒅 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺
𝒀𝒀𝟏𝟏
𝒅𝒅 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺
UK -- -- 33 0.01 25 -- 3 2 34 40 20 --
Russia 1.5 50 40 0.05 31 5 25 8 18 21 22 4
Saudi 
Arabia 1.5 50 25 0.02 35 4 31 9 31 55 19 7
𝜿𝜿𝟏𝟏 𝝃𝝃𝟏𝟏
𝒘𝒘 𝝃𝝃𝟏𝟏
𝒑𝒑 𝜾𝜾𝟏𝟏
𝒘𝒘 𝜾𝜾𝟏𝟏
𝒑𝒑
UK 92 32 72 32 45
Russia 50 65 62 22 90
Saudi Arabia 75 80 59 28 74
With different policy toolkits and elasticities
Policy toolkit differs—not all oil 
exporters are alike: 
Policy levers
• Unlike the UK which taxes oil and labor more 
than other sectors, and whose monetary 
policy favors fighting inflation and interest 
rate volatility
• Saudi firms and HHs least taxed, whose 
monetary policy favors targeting the level of 
the exchange rate (peg)
• While Russia is an intermediate case  
Tax elasticities
• UK makes full use of highly elastic VAT, with 
Saudi less so, opening room for further effort
• Russia makes full use of highly elastic CIT, 
with Saudi almost none, opening room for 
further effort
• Neither Russia nor Saudi have taxed fuel used 
in consumption or production, opening room 
for further effort  
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Elasticities VAT
Labor 
Income 
to GDP
Labor 
Income 
to 
public 
debt
Social 
security 
to public 
debt
Fuel 
taxes to 
oil 
demand
CIT to firm 
profitability
Taxes on natural 
resource sector
UK 124 99 58 8 89 41 15
Russia 71 101 91 88 -- 99 158
Saudi 
Arabia 95 -- -- 80 -- 90 111
𝜏𝜏1
𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜏𝜏1
𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜏𝜏1
𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜏𝜏1
𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜏𝜏1
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜏𝜏1
𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜏𝜏1
𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝛾𝛾1
𝜋𝜋 𝛾𝛾1
𝑦𝑦 𝛾𝛾1
𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾1
𝑒𝑒
UK 10 19 12 44 12 15 35 45 13 93 --
Russia 15 13 -- -- 30 58 50 37 23 88 83
Saudi 
Arabia 4 -- 10 -- -- 1 71 19 29 20 108
ESTIMATION—RESPONSES TO SHOCKS
17
Durable gains from reducing current spending
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Does it hurt? 
Temporary pain for large 
and durable gains later
• Reducing size of Russian Cg
fruitful as estimated shock 
large and most persistent, –
ΔDebtgov
• While output response to –
ΔCg hurts for 7 quarters, it’s 
a temporary pain
• As from the supply: the 
response of MP of all factors 
positive, esp. +ΔMPL, and 
competitiveness 
• Reinforced from the 
demand side: HHs receive 
+Δ wealth effect, –ΔLs and 
+ΔCp
Smaller gains from capital spending cuts
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Does it hurt? 
Less, with durable but 
smaller gains
• Saudi has the most 
persistent Ig shock, 
perhaps due to high 
correlation between Po
and Ig, and large Ig share 
• While –Δ Ig hurts Saudi Y 
initially, doesn’t affect 
Russian Y—with both 
+ΔYp over MT
• Supply side channels 
dominate: +ΔMPkg
Oil intensity has benefits, but dangerous in LT 
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Shifts away from fossil fuels—
does it hurt oil exporters?
Medium term gains, but Dutch 
disease and vulnerabilities 
build
• Foreign oil intensity shock—i.e., 
demand for oil in ROW falls, 
reducing global Po
• Both Russia and Saudi are oil-
intense in consumption and 
production, -so ΔPo results in a 
domestic boom in oil and labor 
demand, along with +ΔMPL,K
• While +ΔY, +ΔYp , only half of the 
+Δ absorption, i.e. large income 
windfall, with Dutch disease 
affects:
– rer appreciates as pressure on 
relative NT/T from boom 
– +ΔDebtgov
ESTIMATION—SHOCK DECOMPOSITIONS
21
Diverging output volatility drivers during 2014
Saudi Arabian economy started contracting 2012Q4, led by a 
domestic productivity collapse, with oil demand and supply 
attenuating. These roles reversed in 2014Q3, and in 2014Q3&4 
weak foreign demand pushed the economy back into recession.
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Prior to oil price collapse and Crimean war of 2014, the Russian economy 
was slowing on weak domestic and foreign confidence (e.g., low FDI), with 
oil supply and demand attenuating. 2014Q1 onwards, sanctions and oil 
price collapse led to a depreciating REER, IT thus interest rates were hiked 
temporarily hurting the economy. 
Historical decomposition of GDP growth’s deviation from its mean
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
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What works best? 
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No policy action Floating the exchange rate No policy action Tax rate reforms
Russia
ΔY, -ΔRER, ΔNX, ΔINV
Channels: temporary and small 
+ΔNon-oil prices and wages
(no Balassa-Samuelson)
No difference As before Debt increase is marginal, while RER appreciation is very minor
Saudi 
Arabia
ΔY, ΔINV, -ΔRER, ΔNX, but non-oil 
exports take 5 years to respond—NO 
DIVERSIFICATION—plus persistent 
+Δnon-oil prices and wages (pressure 
on supply side); +Δinterest rate
Key difference: Non-oil 
exports pick up immediately, 
despite much larger REER 
volatility. Why? +ΔNon-oil 
prices and wage rise only a 
little and temporarily, but fall 
thereafter
As before
Debt increase is marginal, while 
RER appreciation is very minor
Improving productivity Moving away from fossil fuels
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
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Bottom Lines and Policy Implications
• We have shown how the diverse underlying economic structures of oil exporters play a role in fiscal 
consolidation:
– Current spending-led fiscal consolidation has temporary contractionary effects, as in text books or in the UK 
economy. But unlike the UK, current spending-led fiscal consolidation has positive and durable medium-term
effects, especially in Russia, including an improvement in competitiveness. 
– Capital spending-led fiscal consolidation has no temporary contractionary effects in Russia and Saudi Arabia, unlike 
the text book and UK. But it’s medium-term gains are smaller than current spending led fiscal consolidation.    
• When the global economy is doing well, a decline in oil intensity in the rest of the world (i.e., less oil used 
in consumption and production) surprisingly results in a semi-persistent domestic boom in these 
economies due to both supply and demand side factors and their own higher oil intensity. However, this 
boom results in Dutch disease and increasing vulnerabilities. 
• To support medium-term growth, adjustment could target a more flexible exchange rate in Saudi Arabia if 
and only if there are reforms to support productivity gains.
• In the presence of foreign oil intensity shocks, i.e. a shift away from fossil fuels, tax reforms that shift the 
structure towards labor and fuel taxes, allows for a reduction in debt and less Dutch disease.  
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Questions?
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Contact us:
sbeidasstrom@imf.org   or   m.lorusso@hw.ac.uk
Background
• UK. Post Brexit sterling depreciated, pushing up inflation, depressing private 
consumption, and business investment growth; growth moderated in 2017 despite 
significant monetary policy easing and strong trading partner growth; subdued in the 
near term; medium term growth depends on the extent of recovery of labor productivity
• Russia. Floated in Jan 2015 (stopped intervening and continued to hike  interest rates); 
economy in 2017 stabilizing and coming out deep recession; but fiscal-state dominance 
and oil-dependency remain and structurally weak economy; suffered from Dutch disease 
in past; to lift growth diversify exports towards more complex and higher-value added 
products and services [and to sanction-free and faster growing trading partners] 
• Saudi Arabia. Vision 2030 to diversify the economy; OPEC+ agreement to reduce oil 
supply & overall growth zero in 2017; but faster over MT due to structural reforms; 5% 
VAT introduced Jan 2018 but not enough to stem deficit/drain on NIR; reducing wage bill 
and administered utility prices would create room for pro-poor spending; removing 
obstacles to private sector led employment and growth. Exchange rate pegged.  
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And non-oil GDP Growth 
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